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Abstract
We examine a static one-riskfree-one-risky asset portfolio choice
when the investor’s well-being is affected by the anticipatory feelings
associated to potential capital gains and losses. These feelings can
be manipulated by the choice of subjective beliefs on the distribution
of returns. However, the bias of these endogeneous subjective beliefs
induces the choice of a portfolio that is suboptimal with respect to the
objective expected utility of final wealth. We characterize the struc-
ture of these optimal beliefs. We show that the subjective probability
distribution must be degenerated at the lower and upper bounds of
feasible returns. When the intensity of anticipatory feelings is small,
the formation of beliefs must be biased in favor of optimism, which
implies an increase in the equilibrium demand for the risky asset. We
also show that the optimal beliefs are approximately independent of
the investor’s degree of risk aversion.
Keywords: anticipatory feelings, portfolio choice, overconfidence,
method Coué.
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”Supervise especially your thoughts, because it is they which
determine your life.” Old Testament
1 Introduction
In the late XIXth century, Emile Coué, a french psychologist at the University
of Nancy, promoted the idea that learning to control our thoughts can do
much to improve well-being. Positive thinking does improve the quality of life
of patients with a life-threatening disease by inducing a them to reduce their
subjective probability of dying. It also seems to generate a positive placebo
effect on the objective health risk. Nowadays, we hear medical practitioners
telling their patients how important it is to have a positive attitude towards
their health hazard. The so-called ”method Coué” has however an important
undesirable effect. By artificially downgrading the risk, the patient may in
consequence prefer to spend less effort to fight the illness. Psychotherapists
are well aware of the problem, as most of them forcefully claim that the
method does never replace the medical treatment.
In this paper, we want to apply these ideas to other choice problems
under uncertainty. In particular, we examine the portfolio choice problem of
risk-averse consumers.1 Of course, they cannot be any placebo effect in this
case, since asset returns are totally out of control of individual investors. As
in Brunnermeier and Parker (2003), we add two ingredients in the standard
portfolio choice problem. First, we recognize that current felicity is affected
by the anticipation of future pleasures and displeasures. As a consequence,
controlling our thoughts about the likelihood of these events has a direct
effect on welfare. In a portfolio context, positive thinking implies a mental
manipulation of the objective probability distribution of assets return. If the
investor has a positive demand for stocks, method Coué means increasing
the subjective probability of a positive excess return. The undesirable effect
of positive thinking is that this manipulation of beliefs is likely to affect the
asset allocation of the investor. This in turn affects negatively the investor’s
1Alternative interpretations of our choice problem can be found in insurance economics
and in the theory of investment. A consumer faces a risk of loss for which there exists
an insurance market offering proportional insurance contracts with an actuarially unfair
tariff. The problem of the consumer is to select the rate of insurance coverage for the
risk. In the theory of investment, a risk-averse entrepreneur with a linear technology must
determine the optimal capacity of production under uncertainty about the output price.
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future felicity. We assume that the investor selects subjective beliefs in order
to maximize his lifetime well-being which is an increasing function of both
current and future felicities. Because positive thinking raises current felicity
but reduces future felicity, the problem of method Coué is to determine the
best compromise between these two opposite forces.
This work departs from the long tradition in economics to measure an
individual’s lifetime utility has a discounted sum of his flow of felicity, as
described for example by Samuelson (1937). This tradition is incompatible
with the idea that happiness is extracted not only from the immediate con-
sumption of goods and services, but also from thoughts. This is particularly
the case for thoughts related to savoring the possibility of future pleasant
events, or to fearing anxiously the consequences of adverse ones. Imagina-
tion is one of the principal forces of human beings. Anticipatory feelings
have been incorporated in preferences by Caplin and Leahy (2001) who con-
sidered belief-dependent felicity functions. In the economic literature, Akerlof
and Dickens (1982) are probably the first to assume that subjective beliefs
are derived from a welfare-maximizing process.
The distortion of beliefs affects the individual’s decision process. There is
an important literature on the effect of a change in the distribution of risk on
the optimal exposure to it. In the case of the one-riskfree-one-risky portfolio
choice problem that we examine in this paper, Rothschild and Stiglitz (1971)
have shown that an increase in risk in the distribution of returns of the risky
asset does not necessarily reduces the demand for the risky asset. In the same
fashion, Fishburn and Porter (1976) have shown that a first-order stochasti-
cally favorable shift in this distribution can reduce the demand for the risky
asset by some risk-averse investors. More recently, Abel (2002) considered
the effect of distorted beliefs on the equilibrium asset prices. Abel defined
optimism by using very specific first-order stochastic dominant shifts in the
subjective distribution of the risky asset’s payoffs. He showed that optimism
raises the demand for this asset, thereby reducing the equity premium. This
observation is particularly important in our framework as we will show that
risk-averse agents optimally distort the distribution of the risky asset in an
optimistic way.
Our model is a two-date version of the dynamic model examined by Brun-
nermeier and Parker (2003), hereafter denoted BP. Because consumption
takes place only at date 2 in our model, we are not able to examine the
effect of method Coué on savings and consumption. Whereas BP assume
that individuals extract as much lifetime utility from the date-1 anticipatory
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feelings than from the date-2 consumption, we assume more generally that
the consumer’s lifetime utility is a weighted sum of the date-1 felicity ex-
tracted from savoring and of the date-2 felicity of consumption. The weight
measures the intensity of anticipatory feelings, anxiety and savoring. This
parameter of preferences can take any value between 0 and 1, whereas BP
assume that it’s equal to 1/2. Assuming without loss of generality that the
objective expected excess return of the risky asset is positive, any risk-averse
investor with a zero intensity of anticipatory feeling will have a positive de-
mand α∗ for the risky asset. The main result of BP is to show that risk-averse
investors with anticipatory feelings will distort beliefs in such a way either to
increase their demand of the risky asset above α∗, or to go short on the risky
asset. Our work goes into more details in the description of optimal beliefs
and on the demand for the risky asset that they induce.
We first exploit the linearity of expected utility with respect to state
probabilities to prove that the optimal subjective probability distribution
must be degenerated with at most two atoms, i.e., optimal beliefs are binary.
This result is true for any von Neumann-Morgenstern preference functional,
any intensity of anticipatory feelings, and any objective distribution of the
risky asset. In a second step, we show under weak restrictions on the utility
function that investors select the two atoms that are at the bounds of the set
of possible asset returns. In other words, optimally controlling thoughts lead
individual to believe that only the smallest possible return and the largest
possible return can have a positive probability to occur. This strong result
is compatible with the idea introduced by Tversky and Kahneman (1992)
that the worst and best outcomes receive particular attention of decision-
makers. The cumulative prospect theory takes this into account by assuming
an S-shaped transformation function of the objective cumulative distribution
function. This is equivalent to transferring the probability mass from the
interior of the support of the distribution to its lower and upper bounds.2 We
show in this paper that this distortion of probabilities can be explained by a
welfare-optimizing process of human beings with von Neumann-Morgenstern
preferences.
Given the fact that optimal beliefs are degenerated at the extreme events,
the only remaining problem is to determine the subjective probability of the
best state. When the intensity of anticipatory feelings is small, we show that
the demand for the risky asset is larger than the demand that is optimal
2For more details, see for example Tversky and Wakker (1995) and Abdellaoui (2000).
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under the objective distribution of excess returns. Thus, we eliminate the
possibility allowed by BP that risk-averse investors go short on the risky
asset. Moreover, we show that the optimal subjective probability of the large
return and the demand for the risky asset are increasing in the intensity of
anticipatory feelings.
Things are much more complex when we allow for larger intensities of an-
ticipatory feelings. It is well-known that the maximum subjective expected
utility of the investor is a convex function of his subjective probability dis-
tribution. For example, this explains why the value of information is always
positive, or why refining the information structure à la Blackwell (1951)
makes the decision-maker better off. The convexity of the felicity extracted
from anticipatory feelings with respect to the subjective probability distribu-
tion alerts us about an important difficulty of the selection of optimal beliefs,
since the objective function does not need anymore to be concave in the de-
cision variables. In the extreme case where only anticipatory feelings matter
for lifetime well-being, optimal beliefs degenerate to subjective certainty at
either the worse or best possible return, yielding an infinite demand for the
risky asset and unbounded well-being. When the intensity of anticipatory
feelings is large but smaller than unity, the Inada assumption that marginal
utility tends to infinity when consumption tends to zero guarantees that the
actual demand for the risky asset will be small enough to yield positive con-
sumption in all states with a positive objective probability. This implies that
optimal beliefs cannot degenerate to certainty.
The nonconcavity of the consumer’s lifetime objective may generate var-
ious interesting results. For example, we show that Head-or-Tail games with
a fair coin can make consumers mutually better off in spite of their risk
aversion. This requires that anticipatory feelings count more than actual
consumption in measuring lifetime well-being. This implies that it has two
symmetric maximal subjective probabilities p1 > 1/2 and p2 = 1− p1 < 1/2
for the Head state. Therefore, there exists a competitive equilibrium where
half of the population bets on Head and selects subjective probability p1
of Head, whereas the other half of the population bets on Tail and selects
subjective probability p2 of Head. Because all stakes optimally selected by
consumers are equal, the market for bets clear at a zero participation price.
This competitive equilibrium makes all agents better off compared to an
economy where no such gambling opportunity is offered. Notice that when
the intensity of anticipatory feelings is less than 1/2, the lifetime objective
function of consumers is globally concave and no such bifurcation occurs.
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The optimal beliefs are equal to the objective ones in this case, thereby con-
tradicting BP’s Proposition 1(ii) that states that optimal beliefs are always
distortions of the objective probability distributions.
2 The model
Our model is static, with a decision date t = 0 and a consumption date
t = 1. At date 0, the consumer selects an asset portfolio. The portfolio is
liquidated at date 1, and its value is consumed. We consider an economy with
two assets. The first asset is riskfree and yields a return that is normalized
to 0 over the period. The second asset is risky. It yields a random excess
return ex at date 1. It is assumed that the excess return of the risky asset is
bounded downwards by a < 0 and upwards by b > 0. There is an objective
cumulative probability distribution Q ∈ X[a, b] for ex. X[a, b] denotes the set
of cumulative distribution function whose support is in [a, b]:
X[a, b] =
½
F : [a, b]→ [0, 1] | dF (x) ≥ 0 ∀x ∈ [a, b],
Z b
a
dF (x) = 1
¾
The consumer has a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function u that
is assumed to be twice differentiable, increasing and concave. We as-
sume that the Inada conditions are satisfied, with limc→0+ u
0(c) = +∞ and
limc→∞ u
0(c) = 0. The decision problem of the agent at date t = 0 is to
determine the size α of his investment in the risky asset. Because his initial
wealth is w0, he invests the remaining w0 − α in the riskfree asset. His final
wealth at date 1 in state s is therefore equal to w0 + αxs. At decision date
t = 0, the beliefs of the consumer is characterized by a subjective cumulative
probability distribution P ∈ X[a, b] that may differ from the objective prob-
ability distribution Q. Given these beliefs, the consumer selects the portfolio
(α, w0 − α) that maximizes his subjective expected utility. We obtain the
following decision problem:
S(P ) = max
α
EPu(w0 + αex) = Z b
a
u(w0 + αx)dP (x). (1)
The expectation operator EP refers to the subjective probability distribution
P . The optimal demand for the risky asset as a function of the beliefs is
denoted α(P ). It satisfies the following first-order condition:
EPexu0(w0 + α(P )ex) = 0. (2)
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Because EPu(w0+αex) is concave in α, this first-order condition is necessary
and sufficient for optimality. By the Inada condition, it must be true that
w0 + α(P )x > 0 for all x with a positive subjective probability dP (x).
Because of the potential bias in the subjective beliefs, the objective ex-
pected utility of the consumer at date 1 may differ from S(P ). The objective
expected utility of a consumer with beliefs P equals
O(P ) = EQu(w0 + α(P )ex) = Z b
a
u(w0 + α(P )x)dQ(x). (3)
It is important to observe that the consumer’s objective expected utility
depends upon the subjective probability distribution P only through the
choice of the portfolio allocation induced by P .
We now specify the lifetime well-being of the consumer with subjective
beliefs P . At date t = 0, the consumer savors his subjective future utility,
yielding savoring felicity S(P ) at that date. At date t = 1, the agent extracts
felicity O(P ) from consuming his terminal wealth. His lifetime well-beingW
is assumed to be a convex combination of his felicity at these two dates:
W (P ) = kS(P ) + (1− k)O(P ). (4)
Parameter k measures the intensity of anticipatory feelings in lifetime utility.
When k = 0, the consumer has no anticipatory feeling at date 0. When k = 1,
he extracts felicity just from savoring future consumption flows, and current
consumption has no impact on felicity. Brunnermeier and Parker (2003)
consider the special case with k = 1/2.
As justified in the introduction, we assume that prior to date t = 0, the
agent uses method Coué to control his thoughts. He selects the beliefs P that
maximizes his lifetime well-being:
P ∗ = max
P∈X[a,b]
W (P ). (5a)
The optimal demand for the risky asset is α∗ = α(P ∗). The main objective
of the paper is to compare P ∗ to Q, and α∗ to α(Q).
3 Some basic properties of optimal beliefs
It is noteworthy that date-1 felicity depends upon beliefs P only through
its effect on the choice of the optimal portfolio α = α(P ) at date t = 0.
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In general, there are more than one probability distribution that yield that
optimal portfolio α. Let B(α) ⊂ X[a, b] be the set of subjective cumulative
probability distributions that yield the same optimal portfolio choice α:
B(α) = {P ∈ X[a, b] | α(P ) = α} . (6)
It implies that O(P ) = O(P 0) for all (P,P 0) in B(α).
This observation has an important consequence on the structure of op-
timal beliefs. Consider the optimal demand α∗ = α(P ∗) that is induced
by the optimal subjective beliefs P ∗. From the various subjective probabil-
ity distributions P that yields this demand α∗, the one that is selected by
the consumer prior to date 0 must maximize the date-0 anticipatory felicity
S(P ), since they all yields the same date-1 felicity O(P ∗). In other words, it
must be true that
P ∗ ∈ arg max
P∈B(α∗)
S(P ). (7)
Observe that this property of optimal beliefs holds independent of the char-
acteristics of the objective probability distribution Q. It allows us to derive
the following useful properties of optimal beliefs.
3.1 Optimal beliefs must be binary
Proposition 1 The optimal subjective probability distribution P ∗ has at most
two atoms: dP ∗(x) = 0 for all x ∈ [a, b] except at x− < 0 and x+ > 0 where
P ∗ has an upward discontinuity.
Proof: We can rewrite problem (7) as follows:
dP ∗ ∈ argmax
dP
Z b
a
u(w0 + α
∗x)dP (x) (8)
s.t.
Z b
a
xu0(w0 + α∗x)dP (x) = 0Z b
a
dP (x) = 1
dP (x) ≥ 0 ∀x ∈ [a, b].
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The first constraint states that P belongs to B(α∗), i.e., that beliefs P yield
the optimal risk exposure α∗. The other two constraints define a cumulative
probability distribution. Because the feasible set is compact, this problem has
a solution. Observe that the above program is a linear programming problem
with two equality constraints. As is well-known, the optimal solution has at
most two atoms. In order to satisfy the first-order condition, it must be that
x− and x+ alternate in sign.¥
Thus, we conclude from this proposition that the optimal subjective be-
liefs take the form P ∗ = (x−, 1− p∗;x+,p∗) for some pair (x−, x+) and some
scalar p∗ such that a ≤ x− < 0 < x+ ≤ b and p∗ ∈ [0, 1]. It is linked
to the optimal risk exposure α∗ by the following rewriting of the first-order
condition:
p∗x+u
0(w0 + α∗x+) + (1− p∗)x−u0(w0 + α∗x−) = 0 (9)
Proposition 1 is useful because it replaces the problem of finding a proba-
bility distribution in the infinite dimensional space X[a, b] into a problem of
finding a triplet (x−, x+, p) that maximizes W (P ). From the technique pre-
sented above, we can easily derive the following property of optimal beliefs:
when there are n independent assets in the economy, there must be at most
n states with a positive optimal subjective probability.
3.2 Only the extreme returns may have a positive sub-
jective probability
In this section, we first show that at least one of the two subjectively pos-
sible returns must be at the bounds of interval [a, b]. We define A(z) =
−u00(z)/u0(z) as the Arrow-Pratt index of absolute risk aversion.
Proposition 2 The optimal subjective distribution P ∗ = (x−, 1−p∗;x+,p∗) ∈
X[a, b] is such that either x− = a or x+ = b.
Proof: Suppose by contradiction that x− > a and x+ < b. Consider a
marginal change in P such that the marginal increase in x+ is compensated
by a marginal reduction in x− in such a way that α∗ is unaffected. Fully
differentiating condition (9) yields
dx−
dx+
¯¯¯¯
α∗
= − p
∗u0(w0 + α∗x+)
(1− p∗)u0(w0 + α∗x−)
1− α∗x+A(w0 + α∗x+)
1− α∗x−A(w0 + α∗x−)
.
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The subjective expected utility equals
S = p∗u(w0 + α
∗x+) + (1− p∗)u(w0 + α∗x−).
Fully differentiating this equality yields
dS
dx+
¯¯¯¯
α∗
= p∗α∗u0(w0 + α∗x+) + (1− p∗)α∗u0(w0 + α∗x−)
dx−
dx+
¯¯¯¯
α∗
,
or, equivalently,
dS
dx+
¯¯¯¯
α∗
= p∗α∗2u0(w0 + α∗x+)
x+A(w0 + α
∗x+)− x−A(w0 + α∗x−)
1− x−A(w0 + α∗x−)
.
Because x− < 0 < x+ and A(.) > 0, this is unambiguously positive. This
change in beliefs increases the lifetime well-being of the consumer, which is
a contradiction.¥
This result states that at least one of the two possible returns must be an
extreme return a or b. In the next proposition, we claim that the two possible
returns are extreme under some mild additional assumptions on the utility
function. We define relative risk aversion as R(z) = zA(z) = −zu00(z)/u0(z).
It is weakly increasing if R0(.) is uniformly non-negative.
Proposition 3 Suppose that absolute risk aversion is decreasing (DARA)
and that relative risk aversion is weakly increasing (IRRA). Then, the opti-
mal subjective distribution of returns has support {a, b}: P ∗ is distributed as
(a, 1− p∗; b, p∗).
Proof: Suppose by contradiction that x− > a or x+ < b. Suppose for
example that x+ is less than b. We consider a marginal increase in x+ that
is compensated by a change in p in such a way that α∗ be unaffected by the
change. Fully differentiating equation (9) yields
dp
dx+
¯¯¯¯
α∗
= −p
∗u0(w0 + α∗x+) [1− α∗x+A(w0 + α∗x+)]
x+u0(w0 + α∗x+)− x−u0(w0 + α∗x−)
. (10)
By definition of the subjective expected utility, we have that
dS
dx+
¯¯¯¯
α∗
= p∗α∗u0(w0 + α∗x+) + [u(w0 + α∗x+)− u(w0 + α∗x−)]
dp
dx+
¯¯¯¯
α∗
.
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Using (10), it is positive if
K(x+, x−) = α
∗x+u
0(w0 + α∗x+)− α∗x−u0(w0 + α∗x−)
− [1− α∗x+A(w0 + α∗x+)] [u(w0 + α∗x+)− u(w0 + α∗x−)]
is positive. Observe that, by risk aversion,
K(0, x−) = u(w0 + α
∗x−)− α∗x−u0(w0 + α∗x−)− u(w0)
is positive for all x−. Notice also that
∂K
∂x+
(x+, x−) = α
∗ [u(w0 + α
∗x+)− u(w0 + α∗x−)] [A(w0 + α∗x+) + α∗x+A0(w0 + α∗x+)]
= α∗ [u(w0 + α
∗x+)− u(w0 + α∗x−)] [R0(w0 + α∗x+)− w0A0(w0 + α∗x+)] .
Obviously, α∗ [u(w0 + α∗x+)− u(w0 + α∗x−)] is positive. The second brack-
eted term in the right-hand side of the above equality is also positive since,
by assumption, R0 is non-negative and A0 is negative. We conclude that K
is positive for all positive x+. Therefore, this change in beliefs raises the life-
time well-being of the decision maker, a contradiction. A parallel proof can
be made when x− is larger than a. ¥
The familiar set of power utility functions u(z) = z1−γ/(1 − γ) exhibits
constant relative risk aversion and decreasing absolute risk aversion. There-
fore, it satisfies the condition of the above proposition. More generally, de-
creasing absolute risk aversion is commonly accepted by the profession as
a reasonable assumption. Nondecreasing relative risk aversion is compati-
ble with the observation that, conditional to holding a portfolio, wealthier
consumers invest a smaller share of their wealth in stocks.3
In the remaining of the paper, we will assume that the optimal subjective
probability distribution is of the form (a, 1−p∗; b, p∗). It remains to determine
the only remaining degree of freedom, which is the probability p∗ of the
state with the highest possible return x = b. Using an intuitive shortcut in
notation, we can rewrite the problem of selecting subjective beliefs as
p∗ ∈ argmax
p
W (p; k) = kS(p) + (1− k)O(p) (11)
with
S(p) = pu(w0 + α(p)a) + (1− p)u(w0 + α(p)a),
3See for example Guiso, Jappelli and Terlizzese (1996).
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O(p) = EQu(w0 + α(p)ex),
and
pbu0(w0 + α(p)b) + (1− p)au0(w0 + α(p)a) = 0. (12)
Before proceeding to characterize the optimal subjective probability of the
high state, it is useful to determine the effect of an increase in this probability
on the optimal demand for the risky asset. By the Inada conditions, α(p)
tends to infinity when p tends to unity, and it tends to minus infinity when p
tends to zero. In the next lemma, we show that an increase in the subjective
probability of the high return state raises the demand for the risky asset.
Lemma 1 The demand for the risky asset is increasing in the subjective
probability of the high return state: ∂α/∂p ≥ 0.
Proof: Fully differentiating condition (12) yields
∂α
∂p
=
au0(w0 + αa)− bu0(w0 + αb)
pb2u00(w0 + α(p)b) + (1− p)a2u00(w0 + α(p)a)
. (13)
Both the numerator and the denominator are negative, which implies that
∂α/∂p is positive.¥
This result is linked to the literature on the relationship between the
probability distribution of returns and the optimal demand for the risky
asset. Gollier (1995) provides the necessary and sufficient condition on a
change in distribution to raise the demand for the risky asset by all risk-
averse investors. The change in distribution considered in Lemma 1 is a
special case of a stochastic order named monotone probability ratio order by
Eeckhoudt and Gollier (1995) and Athey (2002).
4 The case of small anticipatory feelings
In this section, we explore the special case of small intensities k of anticipatory
feelings. When k vanishes, there is no anticipatory feeling at all, and the
lifetime well-being W (p; k = 0) equals the objective expected utility O(p).
It is obvious in this case that the agent selects the subjective probability
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p∗0 yielding the demand for the risky asset that is optimal for the objective
probability distribution:
p∗0bu
0(w0 + α(Q)b) + (1− p∗0)au0(w0 + α(Q)a) = 0. (14)
It is easy to check that there exists a single probability p∗0 ∈ [0, 1] that satisfies
equation (14). It is well-known that α(Q) has the same sign as the objective
expected return EQex.
We now examine the impact of introducing a small degree k of anticipa-
tory feelings on the optimal subjective probability p∗(k) of the high return
state. We know that it tends to p∗0 when k tends to zero. We determine
the sign of ∂p∗/∂k at k = 0. In order to do this, we first establish the local
concavity of the lifetime well-being with respect to the subjective probability
of the high return state, when k is small.
Lemma 2 Consider any probability distribution P in B(α(Q)) ⊂ X[a, b].
Consider any pair (P1, P2) in X2[a, b] and any scalar λ ∈ [0, 1] such that
P = λP1 + (1− λ)P2.
It implies that
O(P ) ≥ λO(P1) + (1− λ)O(P2).
Proof: Let αi denote the optimal demand under beliefs Pi : αi = α(Pi).
We have that
λO(P1) + (1− λ)O(P2) = λEQu(w0 + α1ex) + (1− λ)EQu(w0 + α2ex)
= EQ [λu(w0 + α1ex) + (1− λ)u(w0 + α2ex)] .
The concavity of u implies that
λu(w0 + α1x) + (1− λ)u(w0 + α2x) ≤ u (w0 + (λα1 + (1− λ)α2)x)
for all x. It implies that
λO(P1) + (1− λ)O(P2) ≤ EQu (w0 + (λα1 + (1− λ)α2)ex) .
We conclude that
λO(P1) + (1− λ)O(P2) ≤ maxα EQu(w0 + αex) = O(Q).
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Because P belongs to B(α(Q)), we know that O(P ) = O(Q). This concludes
the proof.¥
This lemma implies that the objective expected utility O(P ) is locally
concave in the neighborhood of any subjective probability distribution P
belonging to B(α(Q)). In Appendix A, we exhibit a numerical example
showing that O is not globally concave in P . However, because EQu(w0+αex)
is concave in α, and because α is increasing in the subjective probability p of
the high state as stated in Lemma 1, O is single-peaked in p. It implies that
the first-order condition of program (11) is necessary and sufficient when k
is small.
This first-order condition is written as
0 =
∂W
∂p
(p∗; k) = k
∂EPu(w0 + αex)
∂α
∂α
∂p
+k [u(w0 + αb)− u(w0 + αa)]
+(1− k)∂EQu(w0 + αex)
∂α
∂α
∂p
.
Because α maximizes EPu(w0 + αex), the first term in the right-hand side of
this equality is zero. Using equation (13), we can thus rewrite the first-order
condition to program (11) as follows:
0 =
∂W
∂p
(p∗; k) = k [u(w0 + αb)− u(w0 + αa)] (15)
−(1− k) [bu
0(w0 + αb)− au0(w0 + αa)]EQexu0(w0 + αex)
p∗b2u00(w0 + α(p)b) + (1− p∗)a2u00(w0 + α(p)a)
. (16)
When k = 0, we verify that this condition simplifies to EQexu0(w0+αex) = 0,
which is true only if α = α(Q). This yields in turn p∗ = p∗0 as defined by
(14). Because W is locally concave in p around p∗0, the optimal subjective
probability p∗ is increasing in k around k = 0 if and only if the cross-derivative
of W is positive when evaluated at (p∗0; k = 0). It is easy to check that
∂2W
∂p∂k
(p∗0; 0) = u(w0 + α(Q)b)− u(w0 + α(Q)a).
The right-hand side of this equality has the same sign as α(Q). Thus the
sign of ∂α/∂k has the same sign as α(Q). Combining this result with Lemma
1 yields the following proposition. One can measure the degree of optimism
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by the difference between the subjective probability and the objective prob-
ability of the state that is more favorable to the agent’s wealth. When α(Q),
the favorable state is the high return state, and an increase in p represents
an increase in optimism. When α(Q) is negative, the investor goes short on
the risky asset, and the favorable state is the low return state. The degree of
optimism is inversely related to p in that case.
Proposition 4 Introducing small anticipatory feelings in the lifetime objec-
tive function of the consumer makes him more optimistic about his portfolio
return:
α(Q)
dp∗
dk
¯¯¯¯
k=0
≥ 0.
It raises the optimal portfolio risk:
α(Q)
dα(p∗)
dk
¯¯¯¯
k=0
≥ 0.
These inequalities are strict when the objective expected return is not zero.
The intuition to this result is simple. Suppose that the objective expected
return is positive, so that the optimal demand α(Q) for the risky asset is
positive when there is no anticipatory feeling. It is sustained by the beliefs
that the probability of the high return b is p∗0. Consider a marginal increase in
the subjective probability of that state. It marginally increases the demand
for the risky asset. But, by the envelope theorem, this marginal increase in
the demand has no effect on the objective expected utility. To the contrary, it
increases the subjective expected utility. Globally, when k > 0, it raises the
lifetime well-being. This argument cannot be extended to consumers having
a larger intensity of anticipatory feelings. Indeed, in this case, a marginal
change in the subjective probability distribution would have an effect on the
objective expected utility.
In Figures 1 and 2, we illustrate Proposition 4 by assuming that the agent
has a power utility function with constant relative risk aversion γ = 3. The
worst possible return is a = −100%, whereas the best possible return is b =
+150%. The objective probability distribution is Q ∼ (−1, 1/2;+1.5, 1/2),
yielding a positive expected excess return. In Figure 1, we have drawn the
optimal subjective probability of the high return as a function of the intensity
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Figure 1: Optimal probability of the high return state, as a function of
the intensity of anticipatory feelings. Parameter values: γ = 3, Q ∼
(−1, 1/2;+1.5, 1/2).
k of anticipatory feelings. In Figure 2, we depicted the relationship between
k and the optimal share of wealth invested in the risky asset. As stated in
Proposition 4, we get upward sloping curves. When there is no anticipatory
feeling, the optimal share of wealth invested in the risky asset is equal 5.5%.
When anticipatory feelings count as much as the objective future felicity
(k = 0.5), this optimal share goes up to 21.0%.
5 The case of large anticipatory feelings
We have seen in the previous section that the lifetime well-being W as a
function of the subjective probability of success is locally concave and globally
single-peaked when k is small. This does not to be the case when anticipatory
feelings play a more important role in the measurement of welfare. When
k tends to unity, W (p; k) tends to the subjective expected utility S(p). As
seen in definition (1), S(p) is the maximum of various linear functions of p.
Therefore, S(p) is a convex function of the subjective probability p of the
high return. Thus, when k = 1, the optimal probability p∗1 must be either
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Figure 2: The demand for the risky asset, as a function of the intensity of
anticipatory feelings. Parameter values: γ = 3, Q ∼ (−1, 1/2;+1, 1/2).
0 or 1. In both case, the subjective expected utility tends to u(¯ +∞). The
optimal exposure to the portfolio risk is unbounded.
Suppose without loss of generality that the decision-maker with k = 1
selects p∗0 = 1. Of course, this solution is not feasible when k is smaller
than unity, since it yields a negative final wealth in all states with a negative
excess return. It implies that the agent with k < 1must reduce his subjective
probability of the high return. This must be done in order to induce him to
reduce his demand for the risky asset in such a way that w0 + α(p)a be
positive.
Proposition 5 The subjective expected utility S(p) is a convex function of
the subjective probability of the high return state. It implies that the optimal
subjective probability is either 0 or 1 when only anticipatory feelings matter
(k = 1). When k is smaller than unity, p∗ is positive and less than unity.
When k is smaller than unity, W is a convex combination of a convex
function S and of a single-peaked function O. The search for an optimal
subjective probability may be complex in such an environment. To illustrate,
let us consider the case of constant relative risk aversion γ = 3, w0 = 1,
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Figure 3: The lifetime well-being as a function of the subjective probability of
the high return, for various intensities k of anticipatory feelings. Parameter
values: γ = 3, Q ∼ (−1, 1/2;+1, 1/2).
together with a = −100% and b = +100%. We assume that the objective
distribution of returns is Q ∼ (−1, 1/2;+1, 1/2). In Figure 3, we have drawn
the lifetime well-being W as a function of the subjective probability p for
various values of k. When k is smaller than or equal to 1/2, W is globally
single-peaked and the optimal subjective probability is p∗ = 1/2, implying
that investing only in the riskfree asset is optimal. This is an example where
the optimal subjective probability distribution coincides with the objective
ones.
When k is in ]1/2, 1[, functionW exhibits a convex-concave-convex shape,
with two symmetric optimal beliefs. The optimal subjective probability that
is larger than one-half is first constant and then increasing in k, as seen
in Figure 4. Notice that the existence of two symmetric optima shows that
providing zero-sum gambling opportunities can be helpful to improve welfare
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Figure 4: The optimal subjective probability p∗ as a function of the intensity
k of anticipatory feelings. Parameter values: γ = 3, Q ∼ (−1, 1/2;+1, 1/2).
in an homogeneous economy of risk-averse agents. Suppose that two agents
with constant relative risk aversion γ = 3 and with an intensity k = 0.6 of
anticipatory feelings are considering playing Head-or-Tail game with a fair
coin. In this economy, there is a competitive equilibrium where each agent
puts α(p∗) = 21.2% of initial wealth at stake by betting on either Head
or Tail, optimally subjectively believing to have a probability of success of
p∗ = 78, 43%.
6 Approximate solution
Suppose that | α | is small. It implies that we can approximate u0(w0 + αx)
by u0(w0)+αxu00(w0), which is equal to u0(w0)(1−αxA0), where A0 = A(w0).
First-order condition (12) is thus approximated as
[pb+ (1− p)a]− αA0
£
pb2 + (1− p)a2
¤ ' 0,
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which implies that
α(p) =
1
A0
pb+ (1− p)a
pb2 + (1− p)a2 . (17)
Using second-order Taylor approximations for u(w0+αx) yields in turn that
S(p) = pu(w0 + α(p)a) + (1− p)u(w0 + α(p)a)
' u(w0) + α(p) [pb+ (1− p)a]u0(w0) + 0.5(α(p))2
£
pb2 + (1− p)a2
¤
u00(w0)
= u(w0) + 0.5
u0(w0)
A(w0)
[pb+ (1− p)a]2
pb2 + (1− p)a2 .
Let mi = EQexi denote the objective moment of order i of ex. Using again
second-order Taylor approximations yields
O(p) = EQu(w0 + α(p)ex)
' u(w0) + α(p)m1u0(w0) + 0.5(α(p))2m2u00(w0)
= u(w0) + 0.5
u0(w0)
A(w0)
pb+ (1− p)a
pb2 + (1− p)a2
·
2m1 −
pb+ (1− p)a
pb2 + (1− p)a2m2
¸
.
Combining these two observations implies that
W (p) = kS(p) + (1− k)O(p) (18)
' u(w0) + 0.5u
0(w0)
A(w0)
F (p),
with
F (p) =
pb+ (1− p)a
pb2 + (1− p)a2
½
pb+ (1− p)a
pb2 + (1− p)a2
¡
k
£
pb2 + (1− p)a2
¤
− (1− k)m2
¢
+ 2(1− k)m1
¾
.
(19)
It is noteworthy that this approximation is exact when u is quadratic. We
thus obtain the following interesting insight.
Proposition 6 When u is quadratic in the relevant domain of wealth, the
optimal subjective probability is independent of the consumer’s attitude to-
wards risk. It maximizes function F defined by (19), where m1 and m2 are
the objective first two moments of the excess return of the risky asset.
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The first-order condition associated to the maximization of F (p) is equiv-
alent to finding the roots of a third-degree polynomial. This is in line with
the observation made in relation to Figure 3 that ∂2W/∂p2 can alternate
twice in sign, with W having a concave-convex-concave or convex-concave-
convex shape. We check that in the special case with no anticipatory feeling
(k = 0), F is concave in p with a maximum p∗0 such that
p∗0b+ (1− p∗0)a
p∗0b
2 + (1− p∗0)a2
=
m1
m2
.
This means that the subjective probability p∗0 is selected in such a way that
the objective and subjective Sharpe ratios be the same. It yields the same
optimal portfolio than the one that is optimal under rational expectation.
When the utility function is not quadratic in the relevant domain, the
solution presented in Proposition 6 is only an approximation of the optimal
solution. This is a good approximation only when the optimal portfolio risk
| α(p∗) | is small. This is the case for example when m1/m2 is small in
absolute value and k is small. The first condition implies that the absolute
value of α(Q) is small, whereas the second condition means that α(p∗) is close
to α(Q). To illustrate, consider again the case with a = −100%, b = +150%,
Q ∼ (−1, 1/2; 1.5, 1/2), w0 = 1, k = 0.1 together with a constant relative
risk aversion equaling γ = 3. In Figure 5, we compare the true W (p) and
the approximated one specified in equation (18). The optimal subjective
probability of the high return is equal to p∗ = 0.513. It corresponds to an
optimal share of wealth invested in stocks equaling α(p∗) = 6.17%, which is
small. The approximate solution gives p∗ ' 0.515.We see that the size of the
error of the approximation is small for intermediate values of p. When p goes
closer to 0 or1, the induced portfolio risk becomes large, and the quality of
the approximation deteriorates dramatically. This is because the quadratic
utility functions do not satisfy the Inada conditions.
An important question is to determine whether the heterogeneity in risk
aversion may explain the heterogeneity of subjective beliefs in the population.
When preferences belong to the quadratic class, the optimal subjective proba-
bility distribution is independent of the degree of risk aversion of the investor.
When the utility function is not quadratic, optimal beliefs are generally not
independent of risk preferences. Brunnermeier and Parker (2003) conclude
that the heterogeneity of risk aversion in the population could explain the
heterogeneity of subjective beliefs. However, because smooth functions can
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Figure 5: The true W -curve (plain) and the approximate W -curve (dashed)
as a function of the subjective probability of the high return state. Parameter
values: γ = 3, Q ∼ (−1, 1/2;+1.5, 1/2), k = 0.1.
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always be well approximated by a quadratic utility function in a small do-
main, we should not expect to generate a lot of heterogeneity on beliefs in an
economy with small portfolio risks at equilibrium. The assumption of small
portfolio risks is compatible with the general tone of the literature on the
equity premium puzzle. The puzzle is based on the observation that indeed
actual portfolio risks are very small compared to the optimal risk computed
on the basis of the large objective risk premium on financial markets. We
illustrate the low sensitivity of optimal beliefs to changes in risk aversion by
considering again the numerical example used above. We examine in par-
ticular the effect of a change in the relative risk aversion γ on the optimal
subjective probability of the high state. This relationship is described in
Figure 6. The most striking aspect of this figure is the range of the vertical
axe: as relative risk aversion varies from 0.5 to 10, the optimal subjective
probability of the high state varies within interval [0.5126, 0.5131].
7 Concluding remarks
We have shown that the selection of optimal beliefs in the one-riskfree-one-
risky-asset portfolio problem is governed by very precise rules. First, we have
shown that these beliefs must be degenerated at the worst and best possible
returns, as suggested by the cumulative prospect theory. Second, when the
intensity of anticipatory feelings is small, the problem of selecting beliefs is
well-behaved and concave, yielding a unique optimal subjective probability
of the best return. Except in the case of a zero objective expected excess re-
turn, this optimal beliefs always yield an increase in the optimal risk exposure
when compared to the one that is optimal under the objective probability
distribution. Moreover, investors with a larger intensity of anticipatory feel-
ings raise their subjective probability of the good state together with their
optimal risk exposure. Because the mental process of distorting beliefs in
favor of savoring the prospect of large capital gains, the induced optimism
of investors will not be helpful to solve the equity premium puzzle, quite the
contrary. The problem is more complex when anticipatory feelings play a
larger role in the measurement of well-being. In particular, we showed that
the objective function may not be concave in the subjective probability dis-
tribution, thereby yielding potential bifurcation and multiple local maxima.
When the optimal portfolio risk is small, we showed that optimal beliefs are
almost insensitive to the degree of risk aversion of the investor.
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Figure 6: The impact of risk aversion on optimal beliefs. Parameter values:
Q ∼ (−1, 1/2;+1.5, 1/2), k = 0.1.
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This work calls for more investigations in several directions. First, it
would be interesting to examine a more general model in which more risk-
taking opportunities are available. This would be useful in order to examine
the effect of anticipatory feelings on the optimal diversification of individual
asset portfolios. Second, the current model does not take into account of the
adverse effect of disappointment of the optimally optimistic investors when
they will eventually be forced to recognize the objective performance of their
asset portfolio. Third, this work suggests that delegating the selection of
the individual asset portfolios to an independent agent can be efficient.
This would neutralize the negative effect on portfolio choices of distorting
individual beliefs.
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Appendix A: The objective expected utility is not globally
concave in the subjective probability distribution
In this Appendix, we show that O needs not be globally concave in P .
We consider the following counter-example. The consumer’s relative risk
aversion is a constant equaling γ = 0.1. We normalize initial wealth to
unity. The extreme possible returns are a = −1 and b = 1. The objective
probability distribution is Q ∼ (−1, 1/2;+1, 1/2). By Lemma 2, we know
that O is locally concave around p∗0 = 1/2. In Figure 7, we draw the objective
expected utility O(p) as a function of the probability of the high return.
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Figure 7: The objective expected utility O as a function of the subjective
probability p, when Q ∼ (−1, 1/2;+1, 1/2) and u(z) = z0.9/0.9.
28
